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Canon Eos 50D Korean Manual | Full EBook
Canon Eos 50D Korean Manual | Full EBook
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To protect space crews from contaminants in potable and hygiene water, NASA requested that the National Research Council NRC provide guidance on how to develop water exposure guidelines and subsequently review NASA's development of the exposure guidelines for specific chemicals. This book presents spacecraft water exposure guidelines (SWEGs) for antimony, benzene, ethylene glycol, methanol, methyl ethyl ketone, and propylene glycol. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Full content visible, double tap to read brief content. Videos Help others learn more about this product by uploading a video. Upload video To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzes reviews to verify trustworthiness. To protect space crews from contaminants in potable and hygiene water, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) requested that the National Research Council (NRC) provide guidance on the development of spacecraft water-exposure guidelines (SWEGs) and review NASA’s development of exposure guidelines for specific chemicals. NASA selects water contaminants for which SWEGs will be established on the basis of their toxicity effects. To protect space crews from contaminants in potable and hygiene water, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) requested that the National Research Council (NRC) provide guidance on the development of spacecraft water-exposure guidelines (SWEGs) and review NASA’s development of exposure guidelines for specific chemicals. NASA selects water contaminants for which SWEGs will be established on the basis of their toxicity effects to astronauts and calculates exposure concentrations based on those effects. SWEGs are established for exposures of 1, 10, 100, and 1,000 days. This report, the second volume in the series, addresses the development of SWEGs for exposure to acetone, alkylamines, ammonia, barium, cadmium, caprolactam, formate, formaldehyde, manganese, total organic carbon, and zinc. The study committee concludes that the SWEGs developed for these chemicals are scientifically valid based on the data reviewed by NASA and are consistent with the first NRC report. Louis Libraries ( University of Missouri Libraries ) Louis Libraries. This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch. Louis, MO, 63121, US Louis Libraries Louis Libraries Louis Libraries. To protect space crews from contaminants in potable and hygiene water, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) requested that the National Research Council (NRC) provide guidance on how to develop water exposure guidelines and review NASAs development of the exposure guidelines for specific chemicals. NASA selects water contaminants for which spacecraft water exposure guidelines (SWEGs) will be established; this involves identifying toxicity effects relevant to astronauts and calculating exposure concentrations on the basis of those end points. This report is the second volume in the series, Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines for Selected Chemicals. SWEG reports for acetone, alkylamines, ammonia, barium, cadmium, caprolactam, formate, formaldehyde, manganese, total organic carbon, and zinc are included in this report. The committee concludes that the SWEGs developed for these chemicals are scientifically valid based on the data reviewed by NASA and are consistent with the NRC (2000) report, Methods for Developing Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines. SWEG reports for additional chemicals will be presented in a subsequent volume. To protect space crews from contaminants in potable and hygiene water, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) requested that the National Research Council (NRC) provide guidance on how to develop water exposure guidelines and review NASAs development of the exposure guidelines for specific chemicals. SWEG reports for additional chemicals will be presented in a subsequent volume. Du kan altid afmelde dig igen. Its focus is on technologies that identify and quantify inorganic and organic species in water for use during long-duration human missions away from Earth. NASA is interested in sensor suites capable of simultaneous measurement of inorganic or organic species. There is interest in the capability for monitoring species within wastewater, regenerated potable water, thermal control system cooling water, and samples generated from science activities and biomedical operations. Potential wastewater streams, both current and possible in the future, include urine, urine brines, humidity condensate, Sabatier and Bosch product water, wastewater from hygiene, and wastewater from laundry. Multispecies analyte measurement capability is of interest that would provide a similar capability to that available from standard water monitoring instruments such as ion-chromatography, inductively coupled plasma spectroscopy, and high-performance liquid chromatography. Components that enable the miniaturization of these monitoring systems, such as microfluidics and small scale detectors, will also be considered. Ideally, monitoring systems should require no hazardous reagents, have long-term calibration stability, can be recalibrated in flight, require few consumables, and require very little crew time to operate and maintain. The proposed analytical instrument should be compact, require minimal sample preparation, be compatible with microgravity and partial gravity, and be power efficient. Sample volumes should be minimized and should be identified within the proposal. Monitoring capability is of interest for both identification and quantification of organic and inorganic contaminants, including polyatomic ions and unknowns. Examples of species of interest and their levels for measurement are specified in Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines (SWEGs), released as JSC 63414 (last revised July 2017). Targeted inorganic compounds identified in the SWEGs for human exploration missions include ammonium, antimony, barium, cadmium, manganese, nickel, silver, and zinc. But there is also interest in measurement of other cations and anions including iron, copper, aluminum, chromium, calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, arsenic, lead, molybdenum, fluoride, bromide, boron, silicon, lithium, phosphates, sulfates, chloride, iodine, nitrate, and nitrite. Examples of organics include benzene, caprolactam, chloroform, phthalates, dichloromethane, dimethylsilanediol, glycols, aldehydes, formate, 2-mercaptobenzothiozole, alcohols, ketones, and phenol, N-phenyl-beta-naphthylamine. Please see references for additional information, including NASA's water quality requirements and guidelines, and the current state of the art in spacecraft water management, including recycling wastewater. Expected TRL or TRL Range at completion of the Project: 2 to 4 In addition, Phase I tasks should answer critical questions focused on reducing development risk prior to entering Phase II. Phase II Deliverables—Delivery of technologically mature hardware, including components and subsystems that demonstrate performance over the range of expected spacecraft conditions. Hardware should be evaluated through parametric testing prior to shipment. Reports should include design drawings, safety evaluation, and test data and analysis. Prototypes must be full scale unless physical verification in 1g is not possible. Robustness must be demonstrated with long-term operation and with periods of intermittent dormancy. System should incorporate safety margins and design features to provide safe operation upon delivery to a NASA facility. State of the Art and Critical Gaps: There is limited capability for water quality analysis onboard current spacecraft. Simple measurements of water composition are made on the ISS during flight, and these are limited to conductivity, total organic carbon and iodine concentration. For identification and characterization of ionic or organic species in water and wastewater, samples currently must be returned to Earth. Water recovery from wastewater sources is considered enabling to long-duration human exploration missions away from Earth. Without substantial water recovery, life support system launch weights are prohibitively large. Regenerative systems are utilized on the International Space Station (ISS) to recycle water from humidity condensate, Sabatier product water, and urine into potable water (see ICES-2019-36 for more information). Several hardware failures have occurred onboard the ISS, which demonstrate the need for in situ measurement of inorganic and organic contaminants (for examples, see ICES-2018-123 and ICES-2018-87). This will be especially important for human exploration missions in deep space where return of samples to Earth for analysis on the ground will be impossible. Spacecraft water analysis capability will also benefit onboard science, biomedical, and spacecraft maintenance operations. It will be necessary to confirm that potable water systems are safe for human use following periods of spacecraft dormancy (ICES-2017-43). NASA has unique water needs in space that have analogous applications on Earth. NASA’s goal is zero-discharge water treatment, targeting 100 water recycling and reuse. NASA’s wastewater collection differs from systems used on Earth in that it is highly concentrated with respect to urine, uses minimal flush water, is separated from solid wastes, and contains highly acidic and toxic pretreatment chemicals. Only the last gap, technologies to monitor contaminants in water, is requested in this subtopic. Spacecraft traveling away from Earth require the capability of a fully functional water analysis laboratory, including identification and quantification of known and unknown inorganic ions, organics, and microbes, as well as pH, conductivity, total organic carbon, and other typical measurements. SWEGs have been published for selected contaminants. Nanotechnology may offer solutions in all of these application areas. This subtopic is directed at needs identified by the Environmental Control and Life Support—Crew Health and Performance Systems Leadership Team (ECLS-CHP SLT) in areas of water management and environmental monitoring. National Research Council (US) Subcommittee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals: Volume 4. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2004. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals: Volume 4. Show details National Research Council (US) Subcommittee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2004.All rights reserved.Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals: Volume 4. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2004.Activity recording is turned off. Turn recording back on See more. By continuing to browseFind out about Lean Library here Find out more and recommend Lean Library. Download PDFThis product could help you Lean Library can solve it Content ListSimply select your manager software from the list below and click on download.Simply select your manager software from the list below and click on download.For more information view the SAGE Journals Sharing page. Search Google ScholarSearch Google ScholarSearch Google ScholarSearch Google ScholarAstronaut explorers face distinctive health challenges and limited resources for rescue and medical care during space operation. A central goal of space toxicology is to protect the health of the astronaut by assessing potential chemical exposures during spaceflight and setting safe limits that will protect the astronaut against chemical exposures while in a physiologically altered state. In order to maintain sustained occupation in space on the International Space Station (ISS), toxicological risks must be assessed and managed within the context of isolation, continuous exposures, reuse of air and water, limited rescue options, and the need to use highly toxic compounds for propulsion and other purposes. As we begin to explore other celestial bodies, in situ toxicological risks, such as inhalation of reactive mineral dusts, must also be managed. Keywords spaceflight operations, space toxicology, human health, pulmonary toxicity, exposure limits The Space Toxicology: Human Health During Space Operations symposium was chaired by Dr Noreen Khan-Mayberry and cochaired by Dr John T. James as a part of the American College of Toxicology (ACT) annual meeting. The focus on this subdiscipline of toxicology was intended to introduce the greater toxicology community to the unique toxicological risks and human health issues inherent during human spaceflight operations. Space toxicology presents unique challenges due to confined living and reduced gravity. The astronaut crew members experience physiological changes that compound the complexity in managing their exposures to chemical contaminants. This symposium gave: (1) an introduction to the history of Space Toxicology; (2) the processes for setting standards and guidelines for air and water exposure; (3) the process of risk-based monitoring; and (4) National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) research on pulmonary toxicity of lunar dusts. A History of Space Toxicology (John T. James, PhD) The possibility of toxic exposures during spaceflight was a concern from the beginning of human spaceflight by the United States. As our experience grew, NASA recognized that unique air-quality standards were needed to establish boundaries on air pollution and that the sources of pollution were innumerable. Monitoring strategies were developed to meet the challenges of managing toxic events, and control strategies were implemented to restrict the probability of accidental releases. Despite our best effort, toxic events still occur and from each of these we learn to improve our risk profile to better ensure a healthy and productive crew. Sources of Toxicological Risk to Space Crews The earliest toxicological risk that concerned space capsule builders was the possibility of excess off-gassing of materials that would pollute the capsule breathing atmosphere. 1 This was managed by rigorous testing of all materials to ensure that the air revitalization systems could remove pollutants to safe levels. There was also concern that highly toxic propellants could contaminate the extravehicular-activity suits during space walks, and then contaminate the capsule atmosphere when the crew member returned to the capsule. Obviously metabolic products, especially carbon dioxide, had to be adequately managed to prevent adverse effects. As experience accumulated over decades of spaceflight, new sources made themselves apparent. These included utility compounds such as lubricants, cleaning agents, and hygiene products that can gradually pollute the atmosphere. Sudden and potentially dangerous releases that had to be controlled included leaks of toxic compounds from payload experiments (eg, tissue fixatives), batteries with toxic volatile components such as thionyl chloride, and thermodegradation of polymeric materials (eg, shorting of electronic components). As vehicles aged and systems failed more frequently, we recognized additional sources of air pollution such as volatile products of microbial action, pollution from systems leaks (eg, ethylene glycol), and corrosion of metallic materials (eg, cadmium-plated components) that can produce harmful particulates. Increasing complexity of space vehicles, such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the broader range of experiments conducted aboard spacecraft has made the job of controlling air pollution a substantial undertaking. Some modules of the ISS are more than a decade old and at one point there were 13 astronauts working aboard the vehicle while the space shuttle was docked to it. Historical Overview of Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs) NASA in cooperation with the National Academy of Sciences, and later the National Research Council (NRC), has set safe exposure limits for those compounds anticipated to be present in spacecraft atmospheres. The initial effort in 1964 was to set continuous-exposure limits for the Apollo vehicles that were going to the moon and back—a journey that could take up to 2 weeks. This was done for approximately 80 compounds 5 years before the first successful voyage to the lunar surface and back. 2 Even before the first successful lunar landing, missions of up to 1000 days were being anticipated and limits of 90 and 1000 days were set for about a dozen compounds. 3 The grand vision of long missions encountered the reality of high cost, so the mission durations shrunk, and the limits were adjusted to shorter time periods. There was a need for limits for a variety of short-duration flights, and in 1976 limits were established for space shuttle flights. 4, 5 After a decade of shuttle flights, NASA began to envision an earth-orbiting space station in which crews would remain for 6-month periods. In addition, real-time on-board air-quality analyzers were being developed. Thus, it made sense to set long-term limits for this space station that reflected stays up to 6 months and also to set short-term limits indicative of our growing ability to detect and quantify products from accidental releases such as combustion events. In the 1990s, SMACs were set for exposures from 1 hour to 180 days. 6 In the past few years, the possibility of long-term missions to distant celestial bodies has reappeared; and in 2008, NASA set limits for many compounds for continuous exposures up to 1000 days. 7 Modern SMACs (those set since 1992) consider the physiological changes induced by spaceflight. 8 For example, the SMAC for benzene is reduced 3-fold because of the excess risk from space radiation which targets the blood-forming cells of the bone marrow just as benzene does. Cardiac arrhythmias have been documented during stressful times in space, so SMACs for compounds that sensitize the myocardium to arrhythmias are reduced by a factor of 5 to compensate for this spaceflight-induced risk. The space station can be noisy and temporary hearing loss is not unusual in returned astronauts, so the limits on ototoxic compounds are reduced accordingly. Astronauts also lose approximately 10 of their red blood cell mass in space, so hematotoxicants have reduced limits for spacecraft atmospheres. Air-Quality Monitoring—Going High Tech Historically, NASA has obtained air samples during missions and then analyzed those samples when they are returned to the earth. 9 This approach has the advantage that samples can be thoroughly analyzed by large, complex instruments in the laboratory; however, some compounds are lost to the container walls or sorbents and the results may not be available until months after the samples are acquired. This means that any investigation of the source of unexpected compounds found in the samples is severely hampered. We wanted to alleviate this handicap and eventually allow astronauts to manage air-quality problems with on-board resources. Thus, in the early 1990s, NASA began to develop a suite of instruments that can quantify combustion products and a large group of trace organic compounds. Identifying precisely which combustion products will be the greatest threat to the crew is not simple because it depends on the composition of the material burned, the temperature of pyrolysis, and the availability of oxygen. We are currently targeting carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, and acid gasses as the most likely to be harmful. For example, the air conditioner units in the service module (SM) of the ISS, and in the core module of the old Mir space station, periodically leaked Freon 218 (perfluoropropane), which is virtually nontoxic. This volatile compound spreads throughout the station complex and is nearly impossible to scrub from the atmosphere. Formaldehyde is produced by off-gassing and at times has exceeded limits set to protect against mucosal irritation, although no such irritation has been reported. It is always more concentrated in the US Laboratory module than in the SM. 14 Minor events Toxicological events that are sufficient to elicit minor symptoms in the crew have occurred at least since the days of Apollo. Lunar dust, when floating in the spacecraft atmosphere caused the astronauts to don helmets until the dust was cleared. On rare occasions, the astronauts reported respiratory symptoms from brief exposures to the dust. One ground-based worker seemed to develop increasing sensitivity to the dust when he worked with it on several occasions. 15 During the return voyage of the ill-fated Apollo 13 capsule from its swing around the moon, the ability to scrub CO 2 was much diminished. The CO 2 levels eventually reached about 15 mm Hg (2), but no specific symptoms were ascribed to this exposure. 16 On occasion CO 2 accumulates in pockets that are poorly ventilated and this has caused minor discomfort and headaches. In space, there is no such thing as “up” so convection does not move warm, CO 2 -laden breath away from the face. In a stagnant area one can easily rebreathe his or her own exhaled breath repeatedly, causing minor symptoms. Canisters with lithium hydroxide (LiOH) have been used for many years to remove CO 2 from the atmosphere; however, if the LiOH dust is not vacuumed from the canisters before they are inserted into the air revitalization system, astronauts can experience minor upper airway irritation. Fires or pyrolysis events (heating to the point of breakdown of a polymer) are always a concern during spaceflight. In 1997 aboard the Mir space station, the oxygen generator caught fire and was destroyed in an oxygen-rich blaze of rather spectacular proportions. 17 The event was obvious to the crew, so they donned protective masks and did everything they could to stop the fire and then clean up the atmosphere. Although this was a frightening event for many reasons, it was not a major toxicological event because the oxygen-rich fire produced very little CO. It did produce a few ppm of benzene, but this was rapidly scrubbed from the atmosphere by the Russian air revitalization system. Also, during the 1990s, there were several minor events aboard the space shuttle involving pyrolysis of electronic components such as wire insulation, diodes, and resistors. These events produced a strong burned-electronic smell in the cabin and plenty of anxiety, but no serious toxic effects were reported. Microbial contamination of spacecraft systems that are aqueous based can occur under favorable conditions. Under some conditions, this can result in significant air pollution. During the STS-55 mission in early 1993, the waste management system malfunctioned, so the crew began to place some waste in contingency bags. Periodically the bags' contents had to be emptied (squeezed) through a port for disposal into space. The crew reported that noxious odors had contaminated the areas near the bags and that they were not inclined to continue the emptying process. An air sample was taken and its analysis showed 3 di-methyl sulfide compounds. Using bags identical to the ones on orbit and similar waste material, we demonstrated microbial production of these compounds and penetration of them through the walls of the storage bags. 18 Moderate events Fortunately moderately serious events have been unusual throughout the course of human spaceflight. The earliest event that caused moderate toxicological effects occurred aboard STS-40, in 1992. 18 On orbit it was noted that the refrigerator was emitting an acrid odor and excess off-gassing was suspected. Crew members periodically went to a different module to get fresh air. Eventually, the unit was unpowered and all openings taped. When the unit was disassembled on the ground, engineers discovered that the fan motor had overheated. This burned its housing, which was made of polyoxyethylene, an excellent source of formaldehyde when heated. The overheating was caused by set screws on the fan shaft couplers coming out against a guide sleeve so that the shaft could not turn. Since there was no thermal protection on the motor, power continued to be supplied to the locked motor, causing overheating. The odor was so strong that if the crew had not been able to get fresh air in another module, the flight may have been stopped early. During the late 1990s aboard the Mir space station, there were repeated leaks of the ethylene glycol heat-exchange fluid. The vapors caused mucosal irritation in the crew members and if they encountered a sizable bleb of the fluid in the face, then the eyes became extremely irritated. The leaks occurred primarily in the Kvant module where the highest concentrations remained. Once a leak occurred, the fluid lodged on cooler, nearly inaccessible surfaces and remained there almost indefinitely. Ethylene glycol also ended up in the water-recovery system where its removal was problematic. 19 Another moderate pyrolysis event occurred in 1998 aboard Mir about 1 year after the spectacular oxygen-generator fire noted in the preceding paragraph. 20 At face value, this seemed to be a much less significant event; however, toxicologically it was much more important. A hot filter had been prematurely switched into the trace-contaminant removal system and this caused a downstream cellulose filter to burn. A small amount of smoke was observed; however, a few hours later, crew members experienced headaches and nausea. An experimental monitor for CO was aboard and was showing readings above 400 ppm; this was confirmed to be accurate by the amount of CO found in a grab sample that was analyzed on the ground much later. The levels of blood carboxy-hemoglobin were estimated from the airborne concentrations of CO. This was estimated to be as high as 40, which explained the reported symptoms. The peak blood carboxy-hemoglobin concentration occurred approximately 5 hours after the burn. This explains why the symptoms were delayed. Although much less obvious than the oxygen generator fire, this “small” fire was a toxicologically dangerous event.